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THE FAA: A TOMBSTONE AGENCY? 
PUTTING THE NICKNAME TO THE TEST 
Rebecca K. Lutte and Brent D. Bowen 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research was to investigate Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
activity before and after six catastrophic airline accidents to examine the alleged reactive policy-
setting reputation of the FAA. Actions reviewed were regulatory, inspection, and enforcement 
activities. The study revealed that change in agency activity does occur following an accident.  
The location of the event appears to influence the direction of change. When accidents occurred 
within the United States, FAA activity increased following the accident. The opposite occurred 
for airline accidents outside the U.S. The increase in FAA activity following U.S. based events, 
supports the reactive,  tombstone agency  reputation the FAA has acquired. 
In addition, the research revealed nine FAA activities judged by industry experts as 
having the ability to improve safety in the airline industry. Inspections and certificate actions are 
considered activities that will improve safety. Regulatory actions, fines, warning notices, and 
letters of correction were judged as non-safety enhancing activities. The result of this research 
was an increased understanding of how the FAA responds to airline accidents and the 
consequences of the response. 
THE REPUTATION OF THE FAA 
The Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) is the agency charged with safety 
oversight in the aviation industry. The 
organization is under fire in the media for 
not taking actions to meet this goal. The 
FAA has been criticized for being overly 
responsive to external actors. Some believe 
responsiveness to media, following the 
ValuJet accident, played a role in the 
airline s shut down and subsequent 
resignations of several key FAA officials 
(Shifrin, 1996a). During ValuJet hearings, 
Former Senator Cohen told the 
subcommittee,  the FAA s problems are 
much deeper than ValuJet and its troubled 
safety program. The agency s continuous 
refusal to acknowledge its shortcomings is 
indicative of a managerial culture that denies 
problems exist, defends the status quo and 
uses public relations spins to deflect 
criticism  (Phillips, 1996, p. 31). Criticism 
exists over the amount of influence the 
industry, particularly airlines, has over the 
FAA (Ullmann, 1996; Bryant, 1996; 
Gleckman, 1996).  In fact, the FAA admits it 
 works slowly because it needs to balance 
the benefits of safety changes with airlines  
and crews  interests  ( FAA s snail s-
pace , 1999). Critical of the industry 
influence over FAA policy, an assistant U.S. 
attorney, after several investigations of FAA 
positions on safety policies, said to former 
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FAA official, Anthony Broderick,  You are 
supposed to regulate, not represent, the 
airlines  (Cary, Hedges, & Walsh, 1996, p. 
50). 
Others have gone so far as to say that 
the FAA itself is a safety problem (Glieck, 
1996). The organization was described by 
one author (Ullmann, 1996) as  secretive 
FAA management, whose military mind set, 
industry sympathies, and resistance to 
change give critics fits  (p. 39). A 
Newsweek article also presents the claim 
that the FAA is unresponsive.  Thanks to 
inept management, bureaucratic inertia, and 
the constant tugging of powerful economic 
interests, the FAA remains one of the 
government s least adaptive agencies  
(Levinson, Underwood, & Turque, 1996, p. 
46).  The agency has been accused of 
possessing a  tombstone mentality of acting 
only after a tragedy  (Ullmann, 1996, p. 39). 
 In the past few years, the FAA has come 
under fire for being reactive and not 
proactive, responding to safety concerns 
only after a catastrophic accident has 
occurred (Phillips, 1995; Shifrin, 1996b). 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
While criticism of the FAA certainly 
exists, surprisingly, no previous research has 
been located that addresses these claims. 
This research provides the first step toward 
examining the reputation the FAA has 
developed for their alleged reactive policy-
setting practices. An exploration of FAA 
actions before and immediately after a tragic 
event, such as an airline accident, will 
address these issues.  Furthermore, why 
study crises at all if not to reduce the 
occurrence of future events? Perhaps more 
critical than knowing whether policy change 
occurs following a crisis is knowing what 
consequences, if any, such policy action 
brings. Take for example the following 
scenario. A crisis occurs, the crash of an 
airliner. The FAA responds by increasing 
inspections of airlines. Do industry experts 
believe such activity (increased inspections) 
will enhance the safety of the airline 
industry? To explore FAA policy practices, 
the following research questions were 
developed.  
1. Does a change in agency activity
occur following a crisis event?
2. Is agency activity perceived to
improve safety in the airline
industry?
METHODOLOGY 
To address the research questions, a 
method was required that would allow for 
analysis of FAA activity variables and for 
establishing the importance of these 
variables to improving safety. The 
appropriate method should (a) provide 
comparable measures of agency activity 
before and after an accident, (b) result in 
determination of relative importance of 
variables regarding ability to improve airline 
safety, and (c) be congruent with publicly 
available data. 
Given the criteria, the method 
selected was a weighted average. Weighted 
average development begins with the use of 
expert opinion (Clark & Friedman, 1982; 
McMeniman, 1990; Bowen, Headley & 
Luedtke, 1992) to determine importance 
weights. Each weight is then applied to the 
associated data. These values are added 
together and the total is divided by the sum 
of all the weights. The standard formula for 
the weighted average (×) is:
×=  w1X1 + w2X2 + ...... + wkXk   =  ∑wX
w1 + w2 + ..... + wk ∑w
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where w represents the associated weight for 
variable X (Spiegel, 1996, p. 59). The 
weighted average has been used in the field 
of aviation to develop the now well-known 
and highly-publicized Airline Quality Rating 
(Bowen, et.al., 1992). Using this 
methodology would provide the aviation 
industry with a measure of FAA response to 
accidents. The methodology would, as noted 
by Bowen, et. al (1992),  provide such 
information in a timely manner using 
publicly-available data. The FAA has 
expanded public access to airline safety 
data. The release of information about 
individual carriers is in response to a call by 
the public and members of Congress for 
more safety information (Phillips, 1997). 
The move to release information was 
prompted by a deadly year for U.S. airlines, 
the crashes of ValuJet 592 and TWA 800 in 
1996. 
The standard weighted average 
formula can be calculated using FAA 
activity. Weights, indicating the perceived 
importance of each FAA activity to 
improving airline safety can be associated 
with publicly available FAA data. The end 
result is a single value indicating FAA 
agency activity as shown below. 
SAR= w1A1 + w2A2 + w3A3 + ......wnAn 
        w1 + w2 + w3+...wn 
In this equation, (SAR) refers to safety 
activity rating, (w) refers to the weight 
assigned to each FAA activity (A). A 
separate value, or SAR, can be calculated 
for the time frame before and after each 
accident, allowing for comparison of agency 
activity. 
To address question two, frequency 
distributions can be presented. The SAR is 
composed of factors that have been judged 
by industry experts, for importance in 
improving the safety of the airline industry. 
A discussion of the weight assigned to these 
factors, indicating the importance of the 
activity to improving safety, along with 
examination of the level of activity using 
frequency distributions, will address 
question two. For example, if unannounced 
ramp inspections of flight operations are 
judged to be an important agency activity 
for the purpose of increased safety, the 
frequencies of this activity prior to and after 
accidents will be presented and discussed. 
Selecting the Variables for the SAR 
FAA activity was defined as policy 
outputs of the regulatory agency. Those 
policy outputs are regulatory, inspection, 
and enforcement activity. Safety experts 
consider fines and administrative actions 
important elements to consider when 
evaluating airline safety (Stoller, 2000). The 
regulatory category includes two measures 
of activity: number of Notice of Proposed 
Rulemakings (NPRMs) and number of new 
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). The 
inspection category includes en route 
inspections, facility inspections, record/log 
inspections, and spot/ramp (no notice) 
inspections. The inspections refer to activity 
or inspections of the following operations 
areas: flight operations and maintenance. 
The terms used here are derived from the 
FAA Enforcement Information System 
(EIS) code list (Department of 
Transportation, 1998). The enforcement 
category includes three measures of activity: 
occurrence of fines against airlines, 
occurrence of certificate actions (suspension 
or revocation), and written notifications of 
safety concerns and/or violations (warning 
notice or letter of correction).  
The SAR was applied to an equal 
time frame before and after six accidents 
between 1988-1999. Accidents, as defined 
by the National Transportation Safety Board 
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(NTSB), which involved United States 
based, Part 121 scheduled airlines and which 
resulted in 100 or more fatalities were 
selected. Not surprisingly, data show that 
most fatal airline accidents result in few 
lives lost or many lives lost. For example, 
from 1988 to 1999, (a) 13 accidents, each of 
which resulted in one to 25 fatalities, 
occurred; (b) three accidents, each of which 
resulted in 26 to 99 fatalities, occurred; and 
(c) six accidents, each of which resulted in
100 or more fatalities, occurred (National
Transportation Safety Board, 2000).  The
purpose of using these years (1988-99) is to
provide an adequate amount of accident
data. Although accidents of this magnitude
are rare, the time span will result in six
accidents to review (see Appendix A).
DATA COLLECTION & ANALYSIS  
Expert opinion was gathered to 
determine the relative importance of each 
item to improving the overall safety of the 
airline industry. To gather the expert 
opinions, a questionnaire was constructed. 
The subject selection process resulted in a 
nonprobability, purposive sample. Subjects 
included airline safety department personnel 
from U.S. based, part 121 airlines, pilots 
from the primary pilot organizations 
including Allied Pilot Association (APA), 
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), and 
International Association of Continental 
Pilots (IACP). FAA inspectors from regional 
and local FAA offices, investigators from 
NTSB regional offices, and university 
researchers with knowledge and research 
experience in areas including aviation 
safety, FAA activities, and airline operations 
were also included. Researchers were 
identified with the assistance of University 
Aviation Association (UAA). To minimize 
bias, no group was systematically under 
represented or over represented (Folz, 
1996). A pre-test, considered a  critical 
quality-control device  (Folz, 1996, p.120), 
was conducted. Additionally, a test for scale 
reliability, Cronbach s Alpha (Cronbach, 
1951) was calculated. According to 
Carmines and Zeller (1979), this test is an 
 excellent technique for assessing 
reliability  (p. 50) and therefore  should be 
computed for any multiple-item scale  (p. 
51). The values of coefficient alpha typically 
range from zero to one; the higher the value, 
the greater the internal consistency (Spector, 
1992). Generally, a value of .6 or higher is 
acceptable but .8 or higher is preferred 
(Bowen, Headley, Kane, & Lutte, 1999; 
Carmines & Zellar, 1979). This research 
resulted in an alpha of .87. The mail 
questionnaire occurred in two phases and 
resulted in a usable response rate of 48%, an 
acceptable rate according to the literature 
(Czaja & Blair, 1996; Dooley, 1995; Folz, 
1996). Questionnaire results are presented in 
Appendix B. 
Once the results from the 
questionnaire were recorded, the mean 
response for each question was tabulated. 
The purpose of calculating the mean was to 
establish weights for each variable in the 
SAR formula. To continue building the 
formula, the activity data were entered. For 
each accident, FAA data were gathered for a 
period of 12 months prior to and 12 months 
following the accident.  Birkland (1997) 
concluded that two years is an adequate time 
frame to monitor activity related to a crisis. 
Additionally, since the FAA has the ability 
to quickly initiate the variables described for 
this study, and as Kingdon (1995) points 
out, the window of opportunity for change 
following an aviation accident is short lived, 
a 12 month period is an appropriate length 
of time to gauge agency activity. Collection 
was conducted through the use of documents 
search, World Wide Web, and FAA 
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database searches. Since the research 
resulted in a large amount of data, the FAA 
activity data have been summarized in two 
tables. The first, Appendix C, lists the 
activities that were judged by the experts as 
having the ability to enhance safety in the 
airline industry (mean response score of 5.0 
or higher). Appendix D displays the same 
information for those activities judged as not 
having the ability to enhance safety.  
With all the data collected, the SAR 
was applied to each of the six accidents. 
Research question one can be answered by 
comparing the SAR prior to each accident 
(to be known as SAR0) to the corresponding 
SAR following the accident (SAR1). This 
was accomplished by using a simple ratio as 
seen below. 
 
Change in SAR = SAR1 - SAR0  
   SAR0 
 
The SARs for each accident for the year 
prior to (base year) and the year following 
the accident and the change in SARs are 
summarized in Table 1. 
As the data in Table 1 reveal, 
patterns in agency activity do exist. 
Increases occurred following four of the 
accidents under review. All four of these 
accidents occurred in the United States.
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Change in SAR Scores (indicating FAA activity) From the Twelve Month Period Before the 
Accident (SAR0) to the Twelve Month Period After the Accident (SAR1)   
  
Accident 
 
SAR0 
 
SAR1 
 
Change in SAR 
 
PanAM 103 
 
124.3 
 
110.0 
 
- 11.5 % 
 
United 232 
 
477.3 
 
618.8 
 
 + 29.6 % 
 
USAir 427 
 
370.1 
 
388.6 
 
 + 4.9 % 
 
American 965 
 
426.7 
 
384.3 
 
 - 9.9 % 
 
ValuJet 592 
 
47.3 
 
173.9 
 
 + 267.6 % 
 
TWA 800 
 
240.9 
 
349.9 
 
 + 45.2 % 
 
 The SAR following the USAir crash 
increased by only 4.9%. United 232 and 
TWA 800 resulted in larger changes of 29.6% 
and 45.2%, respectively. The largest change 
occurred following the ValuJet 592 accident. 
The SAR increased by 267.6% in the twelve 
months after the DC-9 crash. In the two cases 
where decreases occurred, both accidents 
happened outside the United States. The 
PanAM 103 bombing over Lockerbie, 
Scotland and the American 965 crash in Cali, 
Colombia both resulted in a decrease in the 
Safety Activity Rating. 
To answer question two, those 
activities perceived as having the ability to 
improve safety in the airline industry must be 
identified. This is accomplished by a review 
of the expert opinions. Industry experts were 
asked their opinions as to whether certain 
FAA activities will result in improved safety 
in the airline industry. The results of the 
questionnaire were used to identify the safety 
enhancing FAA activities. 
Based on the mean scores from the 
industry expert responses, nine activities were 
identified as having the ability to improve 
safety in the airline industry. The nine 
activities are listed in Figure 1. The activities 
are rank-ordered, starting with those activities 
with the highest score for ability to improve 
safety in the airline industry.   
1. Ramp/spot inspections - maintenance (5.5)
2. Facility inspections - maintenance (5.5)
3. Certificate suspension (5.4)
4. Certificate revocation (5.3)
5. Facility inspections - flight operations (5.3)
6. Enroute inspections - flight operations (5.2)
7. Ramp/spot inspections - flight operations
(5.2)
8. Record/log inspections - maintenance (5.2)
9. Record/log inspections - flight operations
(5.1)
Figure 1. FAA activities identified as safety 
enhancing. 
Comparing the list of activities 
judged as safety enhancing, to the actual 
activity levels, is revealing. Increases in 
activity occurred in five of the nine activities 
judged as safety enhancing (see Appendix 
C). The greatest increase occurred in the 
highest ranked activity. Ramp/spot 
inspections of maintenance had the highest 
score for improving safety and had the 
largest overall increase in activity level 
following an accident. The overall post-
accident increase in the number of 
maintenance ramp/spot inspections was 
2,229. No change occurred in two of the 
nine activities judged as safety enhancing; 
certificate suspensions and revocations. No 
such FAA actions took place during any 
time period under review. The two activities 
that experienced an overall decrease in 
activity, facility inspections of flight 
operations and enroute inspections, also 
experienced the smallest amount of change. 
It is useful when answering question 
two, to also examine the data related to 
activities that were not perceived to improve 
safety. A summary of change in activity 
levels is provided in Appendix D. According 
to the data displayed for regulatory 
activities, issuance of FARs following 
accidents increased at a higher amount than 
issuance of post-accident NPRMs. FARs 
were rated by the industry experts as having 
a greater ability than NPRMs to improve 
safety. The enforcement categories that were 
judged as not having the ability to improve 
safety in the airline industry included fines, 
warning notices, and letters of correction. 
Three categories of fines were reviewed. 
The category of fine judged as least 
effective in improving safety was the type of 
fine imposed most often. Warning notices 
were issued more often than letters of 
correction although they were judged 
equally by industry experts. 
After reviewing all activity levels, 
the answer to question two is yes, with one 
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 major exception. Agency activity is perceived 
to improve safety in the airline industry. Out 
of nine identified safety- enhancing activities, 
two experienced no change in activity, two 
decreased, and five increased. The exception 
is enforcement activity in the area of fines. 
One category of fines, those below $10,000, 
showed an overall increase in activity 
following accidents. The enforcement activity 
received not only the lowest score for ability 
to improve safety in the airline industry of all 
three categories of fines, but also received the 
lowest score of all sixteen FAA activities. 
The type of fine most often enacted following 
an accident is the type of fine, and the FAA 
activity, judged as least effective in 
improving safety. 
 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the study, numerous 
conclusions regarding agency activity can be 
drawn. Below is a summary of these 
conclusions. 
 
1. A change in FAA agency activity does 
occur following an accident. The location 
of the accident appears to influence the 
direction of change. When the event 
occurred outside the United States, the 
FAA activity levels decreased. Agency 
activity increased following accidents that 
occurred in the United States. 
 
2. The increase in FAA activity levels, 
following catastrophic accidents in the 
United States, supports the reactive policy 
or “tombstone agency” reputation the 
agency has acquired. In every case where 
an accident occurred in the United States 
and resulted in more than 100 fatalities, a 
rise in agency activity was displayed. 
 
3. Nine FAA activities were judged by 
industry experts as having the ability to 
improve safety in the airline industry. 
Inspections and certificate actions are 
considered activities that will improve 
safety in the airline industry.  
 
4. Regulatory actions, fines, warning 
notices, and letters of correction were 
judged by experts as non-safety 
enhancing activities. 
 
5. With the exception of fines, FAA post-
accident activity is perceived to improve 
safety in the airline industry. The 
majority of the nine identified safety 
enhancing activities displayed an overall 
increase following a crisis event.  
 
6. The FAA enforcement activity judged as 
least effective in ability to improve 
safety, was the most often used method 
of enforcement following accidents. 
Fines in an amount less than $10,000 
were the only category of fines to 
experience an overall increase following 
accidents.  
 
 
THE FAA: REPUTATION DESERVED 
 
What we know now is that the six 
cases examined here support the claim that 
FAA activity is driven not only by accidents, 
but by the location of those events. Another 
result of this study is the discovery that FAA 
agency behavior is perceived to improve 
safety. Inspections and certificate actions 
were activities judged as having the ability 
to improve safety. The majority of the safety 
enhancing activities displayed an overall 
increase following a catastrophic airline 
accident.  
The FAA, however, should 
reconsider use of fines. Following accidents, 
the type of fine most often imposed by the 
FAA was a fine below $10,000. These fines 
were judged as least effective of all FAA 
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 actions in ability to improve safety. 
Additionally, since large fines (those above 
$100,000) are rarely imposed, perhaps such 
fines should serve as a  red flag  to the FAA. 
A fine of such a substantial amount may be a 
signal of a growing safety problem. Case-in-
point, the only such fine imposed during the 
period under review for this study was a one-
time $200,000 fine against ValuJet in the 12 
months before the crash of Flight 592. 
Perhaps the FAA and airline managers should 
consider such enforcement actions as cause 
for concern. 
 
 
TAKING IT TO THE NEXT LEVEL 
 
Results here prompt many new 
questions. For example, why the change in 
action following crashes occurring elsewhere 
in the world? The FAA still has control over 
the carriers involved in those accidents. Why 
not exercise it? Perhaps it relates to 
investigation jurisdiction or information 
access? Additionally, why did such a large 
increase in FAA activity (276%) occur 
following the ValuJet crash? Perhaps intense 
media coverage played a role. Does the size 
of the carrier prompt differences in action? 
Another question can be raised regarding the 
FAA use of fines in small amounts. Why 
would the FAA focus on actions that are not 
perceived to improve safety? One may 
assume that FAA personnel are not aware of 
or do not agree with the experts  evaluation 
of these non-safety enhancing activities. This 
study took the first step in exploring FAA 
accident related activity. Additional research 
should be conducted to explore these and 
other related research questions.  
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Appendix A  
 
Airline Accidents (Scheduled, Part 121) Resulting in 100 or More Fatalities for the Years 1988 – 
1999 
  
Date 
 
Flight 
 
Location 
 
Fatalities 
 
Description 
 
12/21/88 
 
PanAM 103 
 
Lockerbie, 
Scotland 
 
270 
 
747 terrorist bombing 
 
7/19/89 
 
United 232 
 
Sioux City, IA 
 
111 
 
DC-10 loss of hydraulics 
 
9/8/94 
 
USAir 427 
 
Aliquippa, PA 
 
132 
 
737 roll over 
 
12/20/95 
 
American 
965 
 
Cali, Columbia 
 
160 
 
757 controlled flight into 
terrain 
 
5/11/96 
 
ValuJet 592 
 
Miami, FL 
 
110 
 
DC-9 hazardous materials 
fire 
 
7/17/96 
 
TWA 800 
 
Moriches, NY 
 
230 
 
747 mid-air explosion 
 
Source: (National Transportation Safety Board, 2000) 
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Appendix B 
Summary of Questionnaire Results (reported by frequency of responses) Indicating Level of 
Agreement Regarding Ability of Activity to Improve Safety in the Airline Industry 
Str.  
Disagree 
Mod. 
Disagree 
Slt. 
Disagree 
Ntrl Slt. 
Agree 
Mod.  
Agree 
Str. 
Agree 
Regulatory 
1: FARs 6 5 1 13 15 13 5 
2: NPRMs 8 7 5 16 10 10 2 
Enforcement 
3: fines < 10K 15 13 11 5 7 6 2 
4: fines 10K -   
     100K 
7 9 13 9 14 7 0 
5: fines > 100K 6 2 9 6 18 13 5 
6: suspension 3 3 4 4 9 15 21 
7: revocation 5 4 4 2 10 11 23 
8: warning 4 8 4 4 26 9 4 
9: correction 6 5 6 8 16 12 6 
Inspection 
10: enroute 1 3 5 4 16 19 11 
11: ramp/flt 1 3 5 4 20 14 12 
12: ramp/mx 0 0 5 2 21 18 13 
13: fac/flt 1 4 1 4 21 19 9 
14: fac/mx 0 1 3 3 20 21 11 
15: records/flt 1 1 4 7 23 18 5 
16: records/mx 1 0 4 5 23 21 5 
 Appendix C 
 
Change in FAA Activity Levels (activities judged as having the ability to 
improve safety in the airline industry) From the Year Before the Accident to 
the Year Following the Accident  
  
 
 
Inspection Activity 
 
 
 
Ramp: 
Maint. 
 
Facility: 
Maint. 
 
Facility: 
Flight  
 
Enrt. 
Insp. 
 
Ramp: 
Flight 
 
Records: 
Maint. 
 
Records: 
Flight 
 
Accidents 
 
 
 
ValuJet 592 
 
953 
 
100 
 
(1) 
 
54 
 
48 
 
102 
 
8 
 
United 232 
 
1,522 
 
127 
 
71 
 
(459) 
 
431 
 
146 
 
127 
 
USAir 427 
 
(70) 
 
8 
 
(47) 
 
500 
 
(127) 
 
29 
 
(18) 
 
American 965 
 
(192) 
 
(21) 
 
(36) 
 
(186) 
 
(100) 
 
(62) 
 
(13) 
 
TWA 800 
 
127 
 
16 
 
3 
 
99 
 
26 
 
55 
 
(16) 
 
PanAM 103 
 
(111) 
 
46 
 
(26) 
 
(25) 
 
(53) 
 
(21) 
 
(14) 
 
Airlines 
Increased 
 
3 
 
5 
 
2 
 
3 
 
3 
 
4 
 
2 
 
Airlines 
Decreased 
 
3 
 
1 
 
4 
 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
4 
 
Overall Change 
in  Activity 
 
2,229 
 
276 
 
(36) 
 
(17) 
 
225 
 
249 
 
74 
 
Note. Parentheses ( ) indicate a decrease in activity levels. 
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Appendix D 
Changes in FAA Activity Levels (activities judged as not having the ability 
to improve safety in the airline industry) From the Year Before the Accident 
to the Year Following the Accident 
Regulatory Enforcement
FARs NPRMs Fines < 
10K 
Fines 
10Kto 
100K 
Fines 
> 100K
Warning  
Notices 
Letters of 
Correction 
Accidents 
PanAM 103 3 1 (1) 0 0 4 (8) 
United 232 6 (1) 4 (2) 0 1 3 
USAir 427 2 (2) 1 (4) 0 0 1 
American 
965 
4 3 4 (3) 0 1 (4) 
ValuJet 592 5 1 0 1 (1) 0 0 
TWA 800 (5) (1) 4 (1) 0 1 1 
Airlines 
Increased 
5 3 4 1 0 4 3 
Airlines 
Decreased 
1 3 1 4 1 0 2 
Overall  
change in 
activity 
15 1 12 (9) (1) 7 (7) 
Note. Parentheses ( ) indicate a decrease in activity levels.
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